














l In result of the PiS government’s anti-EU rhetoric, the
Ukrainian political elite came to the conclusion that Poland
was no longer the best promoter of Kyiv’s European
integration’s ambitions and launched its own campaign
directly addressed to Brussels, Berlin and Paris.
l Polish policy towards Ukraine has to respond to the new
challenges facing the region as the outcome of the Georgian
crisis and Russian resurgence, political crisis in Ukraine as
well as global economic problems threatening severely the
Ukrainian financial and industrial sectors.
l One of the most important priorities of Poland is to bring
about the liberalisation of the Schengen visa regime and
advocate in Brussels for the visa free agreement for the
citizens of Ukraine. Such Polish engagement would prove to
the Ukrainians that Warsaw is serious about its support for
Kyiv’s European aspirations.
l Euro 2012 is a great chance for Poland and Ukraine to
demonstrate to the world that both countries can effectively
cooperate and properly manage the massive movement of
people through the EU/Ukrainian border.
l Polish-Swedish Eastern European Partnership initiative can
play a key role in building up the Polish position in the EU.
It can also stimulate Ukraine to get more involved in solving
the regional problems, maintaining better cooperation with
other countries and launching a reform of the state
institutions.
l The quality and effectiveness of Polish Eastern policy
critically depends on improving the communication between
the President’s office and government. The consensus
regarding strategic priorities of Polish foreign policy should
be reached for the sake of the national interest.
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The legacy of the PiS government’s Eastern policy
Polish policy of supporting Ukraine during the government of the Law and Justiceparty (2005–2007) was largely counterproductive. The PiS promoted an approachof verbal declarations related to the prospective Ukrainian membership in EU and
NATO. Such an approach, combined with the Kaczynski’s government sceptical attitude
towards the EU, weakened the Polish position in Europe. Poland was perceived as
a troublemaker, disloyal to the fundamental values of the EU, but generating problems
and promoting US interests. The pro-Ukrainian, pro-Georgian and anti-Russian rhetoric
of PiS contributed to the alienation of Poland in the EU (significantly, before the
Georgian crisis most of Western EU countries promoted a policy of trust and openness
towards Russia).
The Polish government focused on the dialogue with President Victor Yushchenko,
while neglecting the relations with the coalition (Party of Regions and Nasha
Ukraina) government lead by then PM Victor Yanukovych. In result, the wider
Ukrainian political elite stopped seeing Poland as its most important ally in Kyiv’s
efforts to join the EU and started intensive communication and lobbying directly
addressed to Berlin and Paris. These efforts’ tacit assumption was the rejection of the
participation in the ENP (European Neighbourhood Policy), which Ukrainians see as
aimed at “neighbours” and not future members. Kyiv has strongly opposed this EU
approach, which offered Ukraine the same status as the Maghreb countries have
under the ENP framework.
New challenges facing Tusk’s government
Following the formation of Tusk’s government, the situation in Ukraine and in theregion has changed, creating new dramatic challenges. In the result of snapelections in Ukraine (September 30th, 2007) Yulia Tymoschenko was re-elected as
PM on December 18, 2007 and her party ByuT entered a post-Orange government
coalition with Our Ukraine–People’s Self-Defense Bloc (associated with President
Yushchenko). At the same time Poland entered the Schengen zone, which created a new
situation in the previously well functioning Polish-Ukrainian visa regime. The
implementation of the Schengen policy was followed by the strike of the Polish custom
officers, bringing chaos on the Polish-Ukrainian/Eastern EU border.
Another important external factor was the Russian Presidential elections, held on
March 2, 2008 and ended with widely expected appointment of Dmitry Medvedev as
the third President of Russia.
Later this year Russia invaded Georgia, violating international treaties and sending
a clear signal to Ukraine, the EU and the US that the Kremlin is determined to protect
its interests in the Region, also with military means. Then came the financial global
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crisis and coalition’s collapse in Ukraine. President Yushchenko decided to dissolve
Verhovna Rada and call new snap elections, but Yulia Tymoshenko insisted on
keeping the coalition alive. The financial crisis hit dramatically Ukraine, creating
a panic in the financial sector, reduction in heavy industry and reaction of the
International Monetary Fund, which offered to give $16,4 bn loan to Kyiv.
Tusk’s visit to Moscow and its consequences for
Ukraine-oriented policy
On February 8th, just before the Russian presidential elections, Donald Tusk paidhis first visit to the Eastern Europe. He decided to travel first not to Kyiv, but toMoscow. Improving Polish-Russian relations was high on the government’s
agenda as energy and trade made Russia an important commercial partner. Tusk also
wanted to send a clear signal to Brussels that Poland is not inherently anti-Russian and
that his government was willing to break with the PiS policy. Such a move weakened the
trust of even enthusiastic Ukrainians in Warsaw’s unilateral support for the Kyiv cause.
Critics in Poland and abroad saw Tusk’s visit to Moscow as uneventful and unproductive, 
especially in the context of upcoming Russian presidential elections, which were not
recognized by the international community as fair and democratic. Although the later
events in Georgia proved that the criticism of Russia was well justified, in the eyes of then 
very pro-Russian Western EU countries Tusk passed a test of openness to dialogue with
Moscow. Such a move paved him a way to maintaining good relations with Berlin,
Brussels and Paris.
Schengen enlargement, new visa policy and its impact
on Ukraine
The Schengen enlargement resulted with long lines in front of the Polish consulates(especially in Western Ukraine) and the growing frustration and disillusionmentamong the Ukrainians. Till then the citizens of Ukraine were entitled to receive
Polish visa free of charge and the whole procedure lasted one day. Schengen regulations
imposed a number of restrictions on Ukrainians, including visa fee and new, much longer
and more complicated procedures. The introduction of the Schengen regime was
followed by a strike of Polish custom officers, which contributed to creating a negative
image of Poland in Ukraine. The worst situation was in the Lviv consulate (which is one
of the biggest consulates in Europe), where media reported cases of corruption and
incompetence of visa officers, who refused to give visas to the representatives of
Ukrainian cultural elite. Lviv consulate’s problems were also related to the limited office
space for visa issuing. Finally, after long and difficult negotiations with the local Lviv
authorities, the Polish side signed a deal for building the new office, which should help
improve the critical situation.
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Poland has the biggest network of consulates in Ukraine: Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odessa,
Luck. There are also talks about opening a new consulate in Western Ukraine. Most of 
the Ukrainians (especially in Western Ukraine) apply for a Schengen visa to Polish
consulates. Paradoxically, many Ukrainians still believe, in spite of all the
above-mentioned problems, that the easiest way of obtaining a Schengen visa is
through a Polish consulate.
Small border traffic agreement’s failure
and its impact
Brussels has rejected the text of Polish-Ukrainian agreement on the small bordertraffic because of the controversies over proposed 50 km border zone covered bythe special arrangement. The negotiations were launched by the previous PiS
government and got later signed by Tusk’s cabinet. Now, the whole process has to be
started from beginning – the agreement needs to be renegotiated.
The agreement’s rejection by Brussels has fueled the Ukrainian frustration over their
general treatment by the EU and lack of EU perspective’s offer. In order to cross the
PL/UA border the Ukrainian citizens in the border zone have to apply for a costly
Schengen visa (the practice of the Polish consulates is to offer at first only one-entry
permit). This strongly affects cross-border traffic, also changing the pattern of illegal
trade/smuggling, so popular in this part of Europe (profit can be made on selling the
cheaper Ukrainian gasoline, cigarettes and alcohol on the Polish local markets). In the
eyes of Ukrainians, the Polish citizens are privileged, because they do not need a visa
for entering Ukraine. As a kind of retaliation, Ukrainian border guards and custom
officers often slow down the traffic of cars with the Polish license plates, sometimes
forcing the drivers to pay the bribe for getting served.
Another instrument which became politically controversial in Ukraine is the
so-called Charter of a Pole. The Russian language media in Ukraine voiced a
rumor that in order to divide the country, Poland is distributing under this name
Polish passports, especially to the Ukrainian citizens living in Western Ukraine.
Such misinformation served as a counterbalance to the revelations about Russia
distributing Russian passports to the inhabitants of Crimea (Sevastopol and
Yalta).
The significance of Lviv for Polish-Ukrainian relations
Lviv has always been and still is a city of special importance for thePolish-Ukrainian relations. Although long lasting political efforts have finallysolved the conflict over the cemetery of “Lviv Eagles” (young Polish
volunteers killed during the Polish-Ukrainian fights over controlling Lviv in
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1918–1919), there are still some resentments alive, connected with the past of the
city. Ukrainian nationalists like to promote Lviv’s links with the history of the
Ukrainian independence movement (OUN and UPA) and remember about the
expulsion of ethnic Ukrainians from the Eastern Poland following the WWII (Vistula
Action lasting till 1947). The Polish side revokes the echoes of the Volyn massacre
and would like to talk about role the UPA and OUN played in it. Stepan Bandera’s
(UPA Commander) monument was erected in Lviv in 2008. The Western Ukrainians
treat the soldiers of SS Galizien Division as national heroes; the Poles consider them
to be Nazi collaborators. The Polish guides, tourists and visitors in Lviv sometimes
behave in a way which might hurt Ukrainian national feelings, although both sides
benefit from the bilateral exchange and trade.
Fortunately, nowadays this kind of behaviour is not the mainstream of the
Polish-Ukrainian relations, but there is still a potential which can be used for
dividing the two nations, as it had been done in the past by Germans, Russians and
Soviets.
Euro 2012 – threats and challenges in the context
of Polish-Ukrainian cooperation
M icheal Platini’s announcement on 18 April 2007 that Poland and Ukrainewere selected to host the 2012 European Football Championship wasreceived with overwhelming enthusiasm in both capitals – Warsaw and
Kyiv. Although Donald Tusk and his party’s members developed special affection for 
football, there was no genuine cooperation launched between Poland and Ukraine in
coordinating preparations to the championship. The focus of the Polish PM was to
bring the PZPN (the Polish Football Association) under the government control in
order to purge it of corruption. These efforts ended up with a scandal, which almost
undermined Poland’s ability to host Euro in 2012. At that time in Ukraine the
oligarchs declared their financial contribution for championship’s organisation.
Platini paid a visit to both countries and no decision was taken in regard of changing
the UEFA’s decision. Only Grzegorz Lato, the newly elected President of PZPN,
announced – not very wisely – that if Ukraine is not ready, Poland can organise Euro
2012 in cooperation with Germany. His comment raised a wave of criticism and
demarches.
The current financial crisis, which hit severely Ukraine, can badly affect the
Ukrainian preparations for Euro 2012. This means that the Polish side should be
ready to provide advice and assistance to its partner. The most critical situation is in
Lviv, where there is no progress in securing the financing for the stadium and for
upgrading the infrastructure. For Poland, matches played in Lviv mean a desired
stimulation for the local economy and step forward in maintaining the best possible
relations with Western Ukraine.
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Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership (EP) and Ukrainian
reactions
Eastern Partnership (EP) – a new Polish-Swedish initiative was announced on May23rd, 2008. The Polish diplomacy secured support of Stockholm for proposing toBrussels an upgrade of ENP (European Neighborhood Policy). Soon afterwards,
the events in Georgia demonstrated the weaknesses of the ENP so that new ideas are
needed for strengthening the EU offer into the Eastern direction.
The EP proposal declared:
n De epe ning of bi la te ral co -o pe ra tion. An of fer of more pro fo und in te gra tion with the
EU sho uld be ex ten ded to all ea stern pa r t ners. First and fo re most Ukra i ne wo uld
be ne fit from this; ot hers wo uld fol low ac cor ding to am bi tion and per fo r man ce.
n Creating of a permanent formula for multilateral co-operation complementary to the
existing regional co-operation schemes.
The EP will cover 27 EU countries and 6 Eastern partners embraced by the ENP:
Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Belarus. Ukraine has
welcomed the new initiative, finding it much more convincing and attractive. The EU
has offered to Kyiv a more prestigious associate membership status and stimulated it
to play a leading role in the Region. The work has begun for putting the content of
concrete projects ideas into the framework of new initiative.
The new context – conflict in Georgia, elections in Belarus
and crisis in Kyiv
The new developments in the Region and in Ukraine have created a new context forPolish-Ukrainian relations. Russia’s invasion of Georgia posed a threat toEuropean security and further ignited the conflict between President Victor
Yushchenko and PM Yulia Tymoshenko over her alleged collaboration with Moscow.
Russia also accused Ukraine of supporting Georgians. On the other hand, warships of the
Russian Black Sea Fleet, which is stationed in the Ukrainian city of Sevastopol in
Crimea, took part in the military operation in Georgia, thereby putting Ukraine in a
difficult political position. This annoyed President Victor Yuschenko, who in response
issued a decree requiring the Sevastopol fleet to give 72 hours’ notice of any ship
movements in or out of the port. Russia ignored this. Ukraine’s foreign minister noted
that “Russia should start, without delay, to make preparations for the withdrawal of its
fleet in 2017”. President Dmitry Medvedev immediately replied that Moscow is ready to
negotiate with Ukraine about the use of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea, but will not let
Kyiv dictate terms. The next warning step was taken by the pro-Russian parliament of the 
Autonomous Republic of Crimea which passed a resolution requesting Verhovna Rada to 
recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
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Ukraine also started investigating the claims that Russia had been distributing
Russian passports to the inhabitants of Sevastopol, which immediately raised fears
that Moscow, by encouraging separatist sentiments in Crimea, plans to regain control
over this strategically important peninsula. The same tactic was used by the Kremlin
in the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, giving Russia an excuse for
military intervention in Georgia under the umbrella of protecting the Russian
minority.
The Kremlin also sent strong warning signals to Moldova, where Russian troops are
stationed on the territory of Transnistria (the other frozen conflict zone in the
Region). Then Moscow launched a diplomatic offensive in other countries of South
Caucasus, trying to expand its political influence and counterbalance a negative
effect of Russian intervention in Georgia through brokering the talks between Azeris
and Armenians.
2007 Belarus parliamentary elections created an opportunity for EU and international 
community to test the will of the Lukashenka regime for implementing elements of
democratic reforms. The outcome of the elections was not satisfactory, but Belarus –
trying to balance between Russia and EU – expects some rewards from the West for
not recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
There is no doubt now that the main front-line in this game played by Russia cuts
across Ukraine. The confrontation could be tough and costly, and will test the resolve
of the EU. There is also no doubt that West must show more determination in keeping
Ukraine on its westward path because this is essential to a more secure and prosperous 
Europe.
The differences between the Polish President’s and the
Prime Minister’s policy on Ukraine
The Polish political scene to some extent mirrors the Ukrainian one. In Warsaw, justlike in Kyiv, the conflict between President and PM blocks the way to effectivepolicy making. But the fundamental difference is that Poland is a member of NATO
and the EU, while Ukraine is torn between the democratic West and ever more aggressive
Russia.
The Polish President has developed good communication with his Ukrainian counterpart. 
They share similar values and political vision backing a fundamental approach towards
Moscow. Both of them are on friendly terms with the Georgian president Michael
Saakashvili and both, accompanied by their Baltic counterparts, arrived to Tbilisi during
the last conflict, demonstrating their support for Georgian cause.
Although the Polish PM claimed to have an excellent understanding with his Ukrainian
partner, there are no signs proving that Tusk’s relations with Tymoshenko are that good.
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It seems that – unlike Lech Kaczynski – the Polish PM has decided to keep Ukraine at
some distance, trying to work within the EU framework rather than to develop an
independent position. The new Polish-Swedish EEP initiative is a good example of such
an approach, which – especially after a period of the Kaczynskis brothers’ critical policy
towards the EU – can strengthen the Polish position within the EU.
Paradoxically such two-track approach might benefit both Poland and Ukraine, but
under one condition – that there is genuinely good communication between the
President and the PM, which – unfortunately for both our countries – is not the case.
Strategic policy recommendations
General long-term recommendations
Polish diplomacy should develop a long-term strategy for its Eastern Policy.
Regarding Ukraine such strategy should take into consideration four possible
scenarios:
n Ukra i ne is suc ces s ful ly im p le men ting re forms and mo ving to wards NATO and EU
membership;
n Ukraine decides to cooperate more closely with Moscow while abandoning its EU
and NATO ambitions;
n Political chaos is deepening and the Ukrainian state finds itself on the edge of collapse
and territorial division of the country;
n Russia decides to attack Ukraine (using for example as a pretext the issue of protecting 
the Russian speaking minorities in Crimea).
The strategy should also include a wider dimension of regional and international (EU, 
new US administration, Russia) cooperation, while taking into account the global
economic crisis.
Until now Poland has failed to develop a convincing vision of its Eastern Policy.
Warsaw’s approach has offered a mix of wishful thinking, romantic vision of the Orange
Revolution and simple negation of the Kaczynski brothers’ undertakings. A proper step
forward could be to treat EEP as a good starting point for developing the new vision.
Practical short-term recommendations
n So l ving the visa is sue and ea sing the flow of pe o p le and go ods ac ross our fron tier is a
top prio ri ty. The se is su es de te r mi ne Poland’s ima ge and cre di bi li ty in Ukra i ne. As we
can not mo di fy the ru les go ve r ning the Schen gen ar ran ge ments, we sho uld do
eve ry t hing to ease this pro cess. Po land sho uld also ad vo ca te in Brus sels for
ne go tia ting with Kyiv the visa free agre e ment for the ci ti zens of Ukra i ne.
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n Efforts undertaken within the EU to ease the visa policy should be supported by
a drive on the part of Poland’s police, custom officers and border guards to fight
against organised crime and illegal immigration. The scale of Poland’s cooperation
with Ukrainian police and customs services should also be increased. We should also
constantly remind Kiev about the need to put a functioning frontier with Russia in
place.
n The number of contacts between regions and individuals has to be increased. Such
contacts should focus on EU related issues and business relations between cities and
regions. This concerns contacts with Ukraine as well as partners from the “old”
member states. These contacts would then help to build a pro-Ukrainian lobby
throughout the entire EU.
n The level of youth exchange between Poland and Ukraine has to increase. It is worth
considering the Polish-German Jugendwerk as a model for Polish-Ukrainian youth
exchange.
n The status of Ukrainians living in Poland illegally has to be legalised.
n The joint organization of the Euro 2012 European football championships is a unique
chance for cooperation at all levels between our two states and societies as well as for
promoting the cause of Ukraine in the member states. This cooperation should be
given the highest priority. In this regard especially Lviv should receive the logistic
and financial assistance from the Polish side for upgrading the infrastructure and
building the stadium.
n Strengthening the reconciliation process between Poles and Ukrainians remains an
urgent challenge. We should never forget that the need to remember the past events
carries the risk of tensions between our two societies – tensions which can work to the
advantage of third countries.
n In the economic field, state institutions must support Polish investment in Ukraine.
We also need to examine if such support is needed for Ukrainian investment in
Poland. We must encourage Ukraine to improve its legislation in such a way as to
make business feel more secure and trade more effective.
n We have to build support for Ukrainian accession to the EU and NATO among the
member countries of these two organisations within a diplomatic framework.
n Energy Security – Ukraine is an important transit country which can help to
diversify sources of energy for Europe. Cooperation in this field is an important
element of Ukraine’s pro-European policy and the EU common energy policy.
Poland should devote more attention to this field and work for meaningful progress
to be made on such project as the Odessa – Brody pipeline and other alternative
initiatives.
n The time when Poland alone could campaign for Ukrainian membership of the UE is
over. Nowadays we should be working to convince the unconvinced i.e., Germany
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and France, possibly within the framework of the Weimar Triangle. At the same time
we should build a group of “Friends of the Ukraine”, which would be made up of the
countries inclined to support Kiev on its way to the EU. This group would presumably 
be composed of the Baltic countries, some of the Nordics, the V-4 countries and the
United Kingdom.
n Weimar Triangle might also be a good political instrument for cooperating with
Ukraine. Poland could initiate the revival of this initiative, this time targeting Eastern
Europe. A plan might be to propose a launch of a Weimar Fund (modeled on e.g.
International Visehrad Fund established in 2000), which would provide funding for
multilateral programs supporting democratic changes in Eastern Europe. The Weimar 
Fund could make a significant contribution to the revitalisation of the European and
transatlantic democracy assistance efforts.
n The quality and effectiveness of Polish Eastern policy depends very much on
improving the communication between the President’s office and Donald Tusk’s
government. The consensus regarding strategic priorities of the Polish foreign policy
should be reached for the sake of state’s interest.
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